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DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER
THE
CONSTITUTION: How Best to Protect States
Against Federal Taxation and Regulation
Richard A. Epstein*
There is little doubt that the Framers of the United States Constitution had
little awareness of the immense complexities that would creep into the
constitutional system that they created in 1787 in Philadelphia. Their
challenges were enormous given the necessity to determine the appropriate
relationship of the states, both with each other and with the federal
government. It is that last question that is the focus of this article, which asks
the simple question of what level of protection states have from taxation and
regulation by the federal government.
The first point to note about this relationship is that the Constitution
contains no specific provisions that address these critical interactions. It has
long been understood that the process of interpretation in this context is not
confined to the standard originalist project of finding the shared public
meaning of particular constitutional texts.1 Instead, it is the more daunting
task of finding the correct answer by resorting to basic principles of
“necessary implication” that stem from standard background rules of
constitutional interpretation,2 that often reflect, as was commonly understood
“the great law of self-preservation.”3
The second point to note is that the Supremacy Clause in Article VI,
Clause 2, under which state law must give way to federal law,4 has often been

* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, The Peter and
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, The James Parker Hall Distinguished
Service Professor of Law Emeritus, and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. My thanks
to Craig Fligor and Manuel Valle, University of Chicago class of 2017, and Bijan Aboutarabi and
Thomas Molloy, University of Chicago class of 2018, for their usual expert research assistance.
1.
For my views on this question, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION 45–71 (2014) (discussing rules of circumvention, defenses, and remedies);
Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
2.
See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124, 127 (1870).
3.
Id. at 127.
4.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
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invoked in the post-New Deal era.5 But that clause does not come into play if
the asserted federal exercise of power over state governments exceeds either
the explicit or implicit constitutional limitations on federal power. In the
original constitutional design, two factors militated against the now dominant
view of federal supremacy. The first is that the states were regarded as
coequal sovereigns in their own right, from whom the federal government
derived those powers that were “herein granted” to it, without forcing the
states to eviscerate their own powers.6 Second, that basic point is confirmed
by the structure of Article I, with its definite and enumerated powers that
were widely thought, at the time, to leave large classes of activities within the
exclusive purview of the states. If, as had universally been held before the
onset of the New Deal, activities dealing with agriculture, mining, and
manufacture were all local activities subject to exclusive regulation by the
states, the scope for potential conflicts would necessarily be limited to those
few areas that fell within the scope of both federal and state power.7
The third point deals with what is not at stake in this discussion of
sovereign immunity—namely, the immunity of the state from suits by private
parties for either the taking of property, breach of contract, or the commission
of a tort in relationship to any private person, whether a citizen of the state or
not. In these cases, the small-government case against sovereign immunity is
especially powerful because such litigation functions as an effective check on
the ability of the state to go outside of its appropriate realm. The traditional
principle of sovereign immunity, based on the positivist creed that no private
party can have an action against the state that is the author of the relevant law,
applies with full force to claims of this sort. In stating the case for sovereign
immunity in this context, Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
5.
Compare New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 581 (Frankfurter, J.) (relying on
supremacy), with id. at 592 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (denying its role). As Justice Douglas
explained:
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, clause 2, applies to federal laws within the
powers delegated to Congress by the States. But it is antagonistic to the very
implications of our federal system to say that the power of Congress to lay and
collect taxes, Article I, § 8, includes the power to tax any state activity or
function so long as the tax does not discriminate against the States.
Id. at 592.
6.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
7.
See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250–52 (1829)
(resolving a conflict between federal control over navigation and state police power).
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wrote, “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.”8 Uneasiness with that rationale led to its erosion by
general statutes under which the United States allowed itself to be sued in
specific circumstances. States passed similar laws cutting back, often quite
substantially, on sovereign immunity as well.9 Until 1946, the right to sue the
United States was hedged about with various limitations and depended on the
consent of the United States to suit in individual cases. In 1946, however,
Congress passed the Federal Torts Claims Act.10 Subject to many key
exceptions, that statute authorized some damages actions against the federal
government to those suffering harm from what, except for the traditional
immunity, would be the tortious conduct of government employees.11
To make matters still more complicated, it was widely understood that the
creation of federal jurisdiction under Article III was not intended to strip the
states of their sovereign immunity against suits by any private parties.12 Thus,
when Chisholm v. Georgia held in 1793 that sovereign immunity did not
apply to suits against states brought in federal court under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution,13 the prompt response was the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment in 1795,14 which was drafted so as to suggest the federal courts
never had any jurisdiction over these claims—a provision that was
reinterpreted to allow a state to waive the sovereign immunity defense.15 The
8.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
9.
For example, in Illinois, the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 to 10/10-101 (2017), contains ten complex
sections on all aspects of this problem.
10. Federal Torts Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2012).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 486–87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT
ITS CONSENT. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it
will remain with the States . . . .”).
13. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419, 425 (1793).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). The
word “construed” is no accident. It meant that the Eleventh Amendment is declaratory of the prior
state of affairs as existed before Chisolm. The words “judicial power” appear to preclude any
waiver by the states who normally cannot unilaterally confer jurisdictions on federal courts.
15. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–99 (1984).
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sovereign immunity doctrine did not only apply to suits brought by citizens
of one state against another state, as was the case in Chisholm, but also
extended, by implication given that the written Constitution does not address
the question at all,16 to suits by any citizen against his or her own state.17
It is certainly worth noting that just this issue arose in connection with the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), when the Supreme Court in
Alden v. Maine held by a 5–4 vote that private plaintiffs in an FLSA case
could not, even under the expanded New Deal version of the Commerce
Clause, abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity defense against private
damage suits in a state’s own courts—again as a matter of constitutional
implication.18 That decision followed on the heels of Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, which had previously held that the states were immune to
FLSA suits in federal courts.19 The total package of immunity from suits
raises the key additional question of whether the states should be subject to
direct regulation on employment regulation, when as a matter of basic
economic theory, taxation, regulation, and litigation are all best understood
as both complements and substitutes for each other20: each of the uses some
form of government coercion to achieve a given result, as when automobile
safety can be brought by either direct government regulation or private tort
actions, both of which, ideally, should address the same set of product
defects. Nonetheless, as becomes clear, the Supreme Court has, after a long
and tortuous debate, held that states may be subject to direct regulation by the
federal government, without justifying this differential application of
sovereign immunity.
Put otherwise, the same process of implication that protects states against
actions in private suits could be extended, when appropriate, to protect states
against either direct taxation or regulation by the federal government,
16. For an early explanation of the doctrine, see THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 12. For
one of many modern cases that delves into the dispute, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
17. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1890).
18. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (1999) (“We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under
Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power [under the FLSA] to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.”). The dissent of Justice Souter,
relied on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which he argued required the
contrary result. Alden, 527 U.S. at 806.
19. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
20. See generally Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An
Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND
LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation, Taxation, and Litigation
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 11-12, 2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1783032.
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especially when controversies within the state can also lead to litigation in
either federal or state court. The likelihood of that kind of conflict was evident
from the earliest days in connection with taxation, where the broad grant of
power found in Article I, Section 8 lets Congress lay and collect taxes,
without specifying what persons or property are properly subject to the tax.
Again, only the process of implication allows us to determine how this broad
grant intersects with the present argument that the sovereign states did not
surrender their power to resist federal taxation.21
The argument also applies to regulation done pursuant to other provisions
contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which gives the Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”22 This clause likewise carves out no
exception for any commerce undertaken by the various states, whether in a
proprietary or governmental status. It should be evident that this conflict
could arise even under the narrow, pre-New Deal definition of commerce, as
when the state wants to ship any goods that it owns through the channels of
interstate commerce. It is equally clear that the magnitude of the conflict
becomes far greater once the scope of the commerce power is made virtually
plenary with respect to all economic and business affairs, whether or not they
cross state borders.23 Thus, a deferential attitude toward federal regulation of
state activities in the post-New Deal era raises the stakes in the conflict,
without explaining how it should be resolved.
In other writings, I have made it abundantly clear that I think that all of
the New Deal innovations on the commerce power and in connection with
property rights and freedom of contract are fundamentally misguided insofar
as they promote centralized power that allows for the massive federal
destruction of competitive markets, by putting into their place a wide range
of monopoly structures.24 It thus remains the case, for example, that the FLSA
is as unconstitutional on this view of the world, both as a matter of individual
rights and of federal power, as are the National Labor Relations Act, the
Agricultural Adjustment Acts, and the numerous other New Deal statutes that
put a command-and-control system in place of competitive markets, the latter
which guarantee both greater individual freedom and higher levels of
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States . . . .”).
22. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. On the importance of this term, see infra note 64.
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Cartelization of Commerce, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 209, 211–14 (1998).
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output.25 But in this article, I shall leave those considerations to one side, and
ask the question of how best to treat different forms of regulation and taxation
that generally have passed constitutional muster, in the specific context of
their application against state activities for which the state has inserted a
defense of sovereignty.
One question common to these cases is whether they should be resolved
on the assumption that the federal government has options to regulate the
states only if the states have like powers over the activities of the federal
government within their borders. That assumption follows quite naturally
from the position of coequal sovereigns, even if it would have to be rejected
if the federal government has the whip hand in all intergovernmental
conflicts. The earlier position has a lot to commend itself on as a matter of
first principles, as well as constitutional text, because it introduces an
effective constraint on federal power through a norm of reciprocity—that is,
we can tax or regulate you only if you can tax or regulate us.
The next question is how this norm would play out if put into place. It
turns out that there are three possible variations in the decided cases, which
are relevant whether or not the reciprocity norm offers a sound first cut into
the problem (as I believe, contrary to today’s consensus). The first and
strictest line follows closely on the view that I have already taken with respect
to sovereign immunity in private damage actions. The federal government
faces extensive prohibitions on what it can do, so that it may neither tax states
nor regulate at least some large chunk of their activities. The second approach
uses the familiar device of a nondiscrimination provision in one of two forms.
In some cases, the federal government or the states may subject the other to
regulation or taxation, so long as it does not single them out for especially
harsh treatment. Here too this solution is appropriate for yet another large
chunk of cases. In its stronger form, the provision says that any government,
whether state or federal, that wants to impose the restriction on the other has
to be prepared to impose a like restriction on itself. Each of these variations
has its appropriate niche. And the third position, which I regard as
inappropriate in all cases, is that the entire matter is left to the political
branches of government to decide, chiefly on the analysis made famous by
the 1954 article of Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism,
25. For a small sample on the Commerce Clause, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987). On takings and economic
liberties, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984). On both, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014).
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namely, that those political safeguards were all that states needed to guard
their sovereignty in the broad run of cases.26 In modern terms, this position
looks very much like the rational-basis standard of review as applied to
structural limitations, which is in general a bad approach to any review of the
exercise of federal or state power.27 As noted, there is no one who thinks that
any one of these multiple approaches governs all possible permutations of
federal and state regulation, but there is little doubt that the shift in the center
of gravity has been away from the first position to some combination of the
second and third positions.
In order to attack these issues, it is necessary to figure out how to draw the
proper balance between federal power and state independence. The relevant
metrics in these cases involve typically a trade-off between two relevant
considerations. First, to what extent does the creation of an immunity limit
the power of either the federal or state governments to discharge their own
proper functions vis-à-vis its citizens? Second, to what extent does the
imposition of federal power against the states, or the states against the federal
government, compromise their abilities, as targets of regulation, to discharge
their own respective functions?
In dealing with this cluster of potential conflicts, it is critical to be agnostic
about the scope of government functions on both sides of the ledger. Thus, it
should not matter for these purposes whether the federal claims relate to
traditional night-watchman functions of the federal government, the
operations of various government offices pertaining to patents and
26. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), which
does not address the issue of sovereign immunity directly. But the message is nonetheless clear:
Federal intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for
congressional determination in our system as it stands. So too, moreover, is
the question whether state enactments shall be stricken down as an
infringement on the national authority. For while the Court has an important
function in this area, as I have noted, the crucial point is that its judgments here
are subject to reversal by Congress, which can consent to action by the states
that otherwise would be invalidated. The familiar illustrations in commerce
and in state taxation of federal instrumentalities do not by any means exhaust
the field. The Court makes the decisive judgment only when—and to the extent
that—Congress has not laid down the resolving rule.
To perceive that it is Congress rather than the Court that on the whole is vested
with the ultimate authority for managing our federalism is not, of course, to
depreciate the role played by the Court, subordinate though it may be.
Id. at 559–60.
27. Richard A. Epstein, Rational Basis Review of FDA Regulation: Why the Two Do Not
Mix, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 418–19 (2016).
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copyrights, or the activities of the Department of Health and Human Services
in the administration of its various welfare and transfer programs. Each side
is always allowed under its own constitution to define the set of its own
permissible activities, so long as they do not run afoul of explicit
constitutional prohibitions. There are so many different functions that lie on
a continuum that it is pointless to try to classify different situations on
opposite sides of some elusive line, and no apparent reason to do so. The
same approach should apply to the states, whether they take on traditional
laissez-faire functions, run the programs of social support and income
transfer that are part and parcel of the modern social welfare state, or do
anything in between. Thus, neither the federal government nor the states
should try to limit the range of functions available to the other co-equal
sovereign by artificially singling out “private” functions of a government for
regulation and taxation, while exempting “sovereign” or “public” functions
of the government. It follows therefore that broad pronouncements are correct
to the extent that they claim that it is “unimportant to say whether the state
conducts its railroad [or any other activity] in its ‘sovereign’ or in its ‘private’
capacity,” in deciding whether it should be subject to state taxation.28 Socalled private activities when undertaken by government have as much
protection as the traditional sovereign ones.
In dealing with the larger issue, my thesis is that today’s center of gravity
seriously misstates the correct balance, and that the proper approach involves
much more a mixture of the first two approaches in preference to the third
anything-goes approach. In undertaking this examination, I shall look first at
the tax cases, and then in greater detail to cases that arise in connection with
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which, as should be evident by the references
to both Seminole Tribe and Alden, has been at the storm center for much of
the modern controversy. In those cases, unlike the taxation cases, I think that
full immunity from federal regulation is the appropriate response, just as it is
when sovereign immunity provides an absolute barrier to individual damage
actions in both federal and state courts. Indeed, the case for sovereign
immunity in this context is even stronger because resisting enforcement
actions under the FLSA does not compromise any rights—by taking private
property, by escaping tort liability, or by evading contractual breaches—that
form the heart of a common law system. Yet when it comes to taxes, the
reverse view is correct. The nondiscrimination principle in that context is
usually sufficient to protect either level of government, while allowing each
government to satisfy its revenue needs from individuals who derive the same
benefits from their government as everyone else.
28.

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936).
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In order to defend this thesis, I shall begin with the taxing cases and then
move on to the regulation cases, with special emphasis on the FLSA, which
lies at the heart of so many of these disputes.
I.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAXATION

The first major case on the taxation question is of course McCulloch v.
Maryland from 1819, which involved efforts by the state of Maryland to
impose a tax on all various transactions by the Second Bank of the United
States (“SBUS”).29 The most famous holding of that decision, namely, that
the creation of SBUS was authorized under the necessary-and-proper clause,
is for these purposes taken as a given,30 in order to focus on the second portion
of the opinion, which held that the Supremacy Clause necessarily invalidated
the tax imposed on the bank.31 The only bank to which this tax applied was
the SBUS, because no foreign state bank did business inside Maryland.
Hence a nondiscrimination approach that treats all outsiders as the relevant
class would be of no use in this particular context for a rule that applies to
only one bank. But the situation would be somewhat different if in fact
Maryland imposed the same tax on transactions of its in-state banks, at least
as long as it did not separately rebate the tax to them alone.32 At that point,
Maryland would have to pay a real political price for imposing the same tax
on local banks. As direct competitors of the SBUS, they would gain no
competitive advantage if subjected to the same tax as the SBUS, which is
exactly how a nondiscrimination provision is supposed to work.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall circumvented this argument by
insisting that the Supremacy Clause was the proper ground to invalidate any
state tax on the national bank, which in effect adopts not the
nondiscrimination position, but instead the total immunity from taxation.
Marshall insisted that if the states could tax these U.S. bank notes then the
parade of horribles would follow: “They may tax the mail; they may tax the
mint; they may tax patent-rights; they may tax the papers of the customhouse; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 317–22 (1819).
30. Perhaps incorrectly. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 305–
06 (1993); Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 315–17 (2004).
31. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436–37.
32. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 197 (1994) (striking down a general
tax on raw milk made by domestic and foreign producers and rebating the entire proceeds to
Massachusetts farmers).
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by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of
government.”33
But this parade of dire consequences falls short. For example, suppose that
the federal government passed a law that purported to insulate the SBUS from
all state taxation. Surely that law should be subject to a high degree of
scrutiny because it represents a unilateral action of the federal government to
promote its own constitutional position relative to that of the states. All this
is not to say that the tax should be regarded as constitutionally inappropriate
given its size, which raises awkward questions of degree. But the better
ground rests on the notion that the states as sovereigns cannot do anything to
impede the operation of the federal government. That position should be
decisive against a tax that singles out the federal government for special
treatment, and it should, with only little imagination, carry over to the
common situation where the tax on paper is broader than its operation in
practice. On this view, there is no need to opt for the absolute immunity from
taxation in either direction. The parity principle could allow for limited
taxation on both sides. This taxation is unlikely to happen as to the direct
operations of either government, such as a real estate or revenues of a
municipal corporation. Such an attempt to tax a municipal corporation was in
fact struck down years later in United States v. Railroad Co., on the theory
that a municipal corporation is part of the sovereign power of a state.34
A converse situation arose in Collector v. Day, in which the question was
whether the federal government could impose a tax on the salaries of state
officials, but not on the income of the state government itself.35 The
background assumption was that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County36 held—again by necessary
implication—that the states were not in a position to levy a tax on the “salary
or emoluments of an officer of the government of the United States.” 37 The
stated concern in Dobbins was that Congress would have to increase its
salaries to offset any reduction offered by the tax, in ways that would lead
necessarily to a lack of uniformity in federal compensation across state
lines.38
That argument is sufficient to establish that a parity of approaches is
correct on matters of intergovernmental taxation. But it hardly suggests that
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 432.
84 U.S. 322, 333 (1872).
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 122 (1870).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435, 450 (1842).
Day, 78 U.S. at 124.
See Dobbins, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 448.
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the absolute double immunity from taxation for individual employees is the
correct arrangement, rather than the nondiscrimination principle championed
by Justice Bradley in his dissent in Day.39 His concern was that the general
exemption from taxation could extend far beyond salaries to any other
instrumentality that the state uses, directly or indirectly, to discharge its
public functions.40 This instinct is indeed correct when taken in reference to
the general theory of taxation. The state has to supply its various protective
services to all of its citizens, whether they work for the federal government
or not. The decision to insulate these federal public officials from the taxation
by the second tier of government means that they necessarily receive a crosssubsidy from their fellow citizens, which in turn distorts the state’s
expenditures on its own public goods, which at the time were more narrowly
defined, as nonexclusive goods, thereby excluding all explicit transfer
payments among different groups of citizens.41 Under the nondiscrimination
principle, these public officials could not be subject to any greater tax than
their fellow citizens.
In this instance, the attractiveness of that principle is great because the
inclusion of all working individuals in the tax base has no tendency to lead to
any inefficient form of over- or under-taxation now that the political risk of
singling out one group of individuals has been effectively countered. So the
correct way to put the question is this: which of the following two ways helps
both levels of government function better, first, a total exemption from
taxation for its employees on condition that it grant a like exemption from the
other branch of government or, second, a principle of uniform
nondiscriminatory taxation for all? In my judgment, the latter outcome is
preferable as a matter of first principle to a total immunity from income
taxation. Hence, even if we rightly think that the power of taxation is
necessary for state self-preservation, cutting down on the size of both tax
bases is hardly the way to proceed. The situation is quite different from the
taxation of the revenues or real estate of a municipal government, which is
much more likely to vary widely, thus creating odd and unanticipated
burdens. In those contexts, absolute immunity, both ways, seems to be the
preferable approach.
Nonetheless, the immunity principle announced in Day was truncated in
South Carolina v. United States42 so that it applied only to functions “of a
39.
40.
41.

78 U.S. at 128 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
See id. at 129.
I trace this development in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 194–98 (2014).
42. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
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strictly governmental character,”43 without explaining why both opinions in
Day were wrong in finding that the basic principle covered all activities.
Instead, Justice Brewer, duly cited Dred Scott v. Sandford, in order to uphold
a liquor license tax closely bound to the general police power prohibitions
against the use of alcohol. That tax thus falls within the class of “sin taxes”
that are quite different from the standard revenue raising tax measures
involved in Day.44 The forceful dissent of Justice White took the position that,
as Congress could not prohibit the sale of alcohol within the state, it was
powerless under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity to “impose a
license exaction on the agents of the state” whenever it allowed for the sale
of alcohol inside the state.45 The parity between powers to tax and regulate is
as appropriate here as in other cases, so that South Carolina seems incorrect
as a matter of principle, and, accordingly, should be confined to the complex
situation surrounding the taxation and regulation of alcohol, which at the time
was singled out for special constitutional treatment under the police power,
extending as it does to morals regulation.46
Unfortunately, cases like South Carolina set the table in dealing with the
very different class of tax cases that arise during the immediate post-World
War II period. In those years, one key question before the courts was the
consolidation of public and administrative law in the wake of the 1937
revolution. That effort included such matters as federal preemption of state
law,47 and the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, as an effort to
organize the federal system after its enormous expansion in scope and
importance.48 The same forces of strong centralization at work during that
consolidation period also carried over to intergovernmental immunities. Thus
the 1946 case of New York v. United States49 raised the simple question of
whether a standard federal tax on mineral waters could be assessed against
New York State for mineral waters that it sold commercially from Sarasota
Springs. New York’s defense immediately got off on the wrong foot when it
claimed that the tax could not be imposed because the sale of mineral waters
was “in the exercise of a usual, traditional and essential governmental
43. Id. at 461.
44. Id. at 449 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857)).
45. Id. at 465 (White, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1890) (noting that the states did not
have the power to prohibit the sale of alcohol within the state so long as it was in its original
package).
47. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947).
48. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).
49. 326 U.S. 572, 573 (1946).
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function,” which is of course wrong at the very least on the third adjective,
and perhaps the other two as well.50 But the point should be irrelevant as a
matter of first principle, given that each state should be able to define the
scope of its own activities under its own constitution. The case is just as
strong for nonusual, nontraditional, and nonessential government public
functions, which are of course the standard fare of the federal government as
well. If there is, therefore, any ground of distinction from Railroad, it is on
the ground that a tax on a particular commodity is part of the ordinary flow
of business that does not vary with the size and complexity of the government
entity.
All of these subtleties were lost on Justice Frankfurter, who belittled the
tradition of reciprocal immunities from taxation “at a time when social
complexities did not so clearly reveal as now the practical limitations of a
rhetorical absolute,” without bothering to explain what new conditions for
this routine tax required an upsetting of the traditional reciprocity norm on
intergovernmental taxation.51 Contrary to his views, the correct approach in
this setting is to apply the nondiscrimination norm to both governments.
Accordingly, this tax could be sustained on principles that were as salient
after the consolidation of the New Deal as before, which Frankfurter did in
relying on Justice Bradley’s dissent in Day.52 Unfortunately, the Frankfurter
opinion went badly astray when it took the further step of insisting that the
one-way imposition of the tax was warranted under the Supremacy Clause,
without once asking whether it allowed Congress to displace a body of
intergovernmental immunity that was based on powerful antecedent
constitutional principles that went back to the Founding Period. Instead, he
drew the wrong inference from the state’s decision to become a trader, when
he insisted that this activity alone subjected the states to federal taxation,
without imposing a parallel obligation on the federal government when it
undertakes that same role. It was wrong for him to conclude that “[t]he
problem cannot escape issues that do not lend themselves to judgment by
criteria and methods of reasoning that are within the professional training and
special competence of judges.”53 Ironically, it is to just this problem to which
the parity and nondiscrimination principles together supply a correct
answer—one whose value is not diminished by the passage of time or any

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 574.
See id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
See id. at 581.
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claim of changed circumstances.54 It is of course an instructive challenge to
decide whether the federal government can impose
a general non-discriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or an
income tax laid upon citizens and States alike could be
constitutionally applied to the State’s capitol, its State-house, its
public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes or
school lands, even though all real property and all income of the
citizen is taxed.55

In these cases of strong core government functions, the strong autonomy
rule displaces the nondiscrimination principle on the ground that it is the best
estimate of the joint sentiment of both sides, which could be waived (as it
never is) for a rule of mutual reciprocal taxation.
The shift from pre- to post-New Deal should not in principle change the
basic framework of analysis for intergovernmental-immunity cases.
Nonetheless, historically, just that transformation in federal/state relations
has been wrought through the expansion of the Commerce Clause.
Analytically, however, there was nothing obsolete about the earlier
framework, which had two basic components. No basic federal regulation of
local activities is needed because here interstate competition disciplines local
firms. On the other side, an extensive federal presence is needed to keep the
lines of interstate commerce open so as to create a national market free of
internal barriers. That model too is as sensible with modern
telecommunications as it was with the telegraph, with airplanes as with
stagecoaches. If there was any weakness in the initial model, it was twofold:
first, that there was insufficient federal protection of the rights of state
citizens against their state governments, which the Fourteenth Amendment
substantially modified by design through its explicit limitations on state
power; and second, that the federal government could use its power over
commerce to throttle the free movement of goods and services across state
lines—the very risk against which Hammer v. Dagenhart56 and the Child
Labor Tax Case57 were intended to control before they were swept aside. But
as a general rule the two Frankfurter arguments that always should be rejected
are: (1) changed circumstances require different responses and (2) judges
cannot make the requisite institutional choices.

54.
55.
56.
57.

On this point, see id. at 592–93 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588–89 (Stone, J., concurring).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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REGULATION

The second part of this article is directed to the complementary question
of how the general principle of intergovernmental immunities applies not to
taxation, but to regulation. In this connection, it is apparent in many cases
that regulation and taxation are more or less substitutes for one another and
also for litigation, at which point it becomes critical to articulate a single
theoretical framework that applies to all three simultaneously. A priori, it is
hard to decide whether litigation or taxation is more intrusive, for much
depends on the design of the tax on the one hand and the total expected burden
of litigation on the other, which could easily vary depending on the size and
uncertainty of the potential recovery. At this point, however, the key inquiry
is the interconnection of taxation and regulation, where it is instructive again
to return to the parallel between Hammer v. Dagenhart and the Child Labor
Tax Case. Once Congress could not, under the commerce power, prohibit the
shipment of goods made by firms that used child labor in interstate
commerce, it could not subject them to a special tax directed toward the same
end. In this context, there was no need to insist that all regulations and all
taxes necessarily fall outside the government’s commerce or taxing power. It
is only to maintain the same parity principle that I have argued for here.
At this point, the challenge is how to apply the common framework in
ways that allow for principled distinctions to be made between regulation and
taxation. Once these are done, it becomes clear that while many forms of
federal regulation of some state activities are permissible, the efforts of the
federal government to impose direct regulation on the employment
relationship that a state has with its employees and independent contractors
should be presumptively prohibited given that, in this context, the
nondiscrimination principle offers insufficient protection. This conclusion is
especially strong in those cases where the parity principle has been
abandoned, as with cases under the FLSA, so that the federal government is
always immune from state regulation while states are subject to ever more
stringent federal regulation.
To see how the system plays out, it is useful to start with an instance in
which immunity from federal regulation should not be allowed. Thus, in
United States v. California58 the question was whether a state-owned railroad
was exempt from the Federal Safety Appliance Act59 when it operated as a
common carrier in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held that it was,
58. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
59. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, § 2, 27 Stat. 531 (repealed 1994); Act of Apr. 1, 1896,
ch. 87, 29 Stat. 85 (repealed 1994).
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because it was engaged in the activities of a common carrier in interstate
commerce and was subject to regulation, so that it was “unimportant to say
whether the state conducts its railroad in its ‘sovereign’ or in its ‘private’
capacity.”60 There would be a credible case, however, for such an exemption
if the railroad operated only within the state of California, even though by
1936 the Commerce Clause had been read broadly (if incorrectly) to cover
all purely intrastate traffic on the theory that all railroads form part of a single
grid that calls for comprehensive rate regulation over tracks used by both
local and interstate railroads.61 Remember that all the safety effects are
confined within one state, and there is no a priori reason to believe that state
regulation of local railroads will be inferior to that of the federal government.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court relied on the rate regulation case to dispose
of the safety issue on this ground: “The sovereign power of the states is
necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal
government in the Constitution.”62 The Court then explicitly distinguished
the taxation cases on the ground that the reciprocal immunities from the
taxing power “is equally a restriction on taxation by either of the
instrumentalities of the other.”63 It held, however, that there is “no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce.”64
A sound approach, however, to this problem does not create a broad gulf
between the exercise of the taxation and regulation powers. That alternative
approach is to insist that no state should be able to assert a claim of state
sovereignty for operations by its entities outside its own territory, both for
sovereign and proprietary functions. Both types of activities are subordinate
to the sovereign in charge of the territory, which in the case of railroads on
interstate routes is surely the federal government. Of course, state safety
regulation of interstate commerce may be challenged on the ground that it
imposes an excessive burden on interstate traffic.65 But in this instance, it is
best to be wary of the Court’s insistence that Congress’s “plenary power to
60. California, 297 U.S. at 183.
61. Railroad Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
62. California, 297 U.S. at 184.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 185.
65. It is worth noting that Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who wrote California, also wrote
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), which rejected an Arizona law that required
railroads to break and recombine interstate railroad trains at both ends of the state on ostensible
safety grounds. The terrain in Arizona was no different from anywhere else so this was regarded
as a protectionist device unlike the similar statute which Justice Stone had previously sustained
in South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), where
winding mountainous terrain justified the use of shorter trucks.
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regulate commerce”66 allows the federal government to regulate all railroad
traffic. The invocation of the term “plenary” confuses two propositions in the
aftermath of Gibbons v. Ogden, which used the term plenary just once in this
sentence:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects,
the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in
a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions
on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the
United States.67

In this passage from Gibbons, it is conceded that the commerce power is
limited only to specified objects—only then is it described as plenary and
only with respect to those objects. That is a far cry from the alternative
proposition that the power extends to just about everything and is thus plenary
over all domains of human activity. It is this intellectual confusion that sowed
the vast expansion of federal power that comes with the proposition that the
wage and hour provision of the FLSA applies to government employees.
Quite simply, railroad lines operating solely within one state should be
governed by the total prohibition against federal regulation, not a general
nondiscrimination rule.
The key case for these purposes is, of course, National League of Cities v.
Usery,68 in which the League challenged the application of the minimum
wage law and overtime law as applied to cover virtually all state and local
employees in 1974.69 That move followed two earlier expansions of the
FLSA: the 1961 Amendments extended the coverage of the FLSA to those
persons who worked in “enterprises” that were analogous to people who
worked in the private sector,70 and the 1966 Amendments extended coverage
to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.71 Using the lax
rational-basis test, the Supreme Court sustained the amendments in Maryland
66. California, 297 U.S. at 185.
67. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
68. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
69. Id. at 836–37. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-258, sec. 6(a)(1),
§ 3(d), 88 Stat. 54, 58 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012)), modified the term “employer” to
“include[] a public agency.” Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 838.
70. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (1961); Nat’l
League, 426 U.S. at 837.
71. Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 837–38; see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-601, sec. 102(b), § 3(d), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)
(2012)).
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v. Wirtz72 against the charge that they fell outside of Congress’s reach under
the Commerce Clause. In dissent, Justices Douglas and Stewart argued that
these activities were immune from federal regulation because they were
undertaken by the state in its sovereign capacity.73
After Wirtz, the law veered sharply in the other direction in National
League. There, Justice Rehnquist conceded that the federal government had
the power to regulate private employers under the Commerce Clause, but
drew the line at the regulation of “the States as States.”74 Thereafter, his
opinion embraced the view that the FLSA did not apply to the states “in areas
of traditional governmental functions.”75 At this point, Justice Rehnquist
opened up the gratuitous line-drawing problem needed to decide which
“sovereign” activities were exempt from the FLSA and which “proprietary”
or “nontraditional” ones were subject to its commands.
Rehnquist led with his chin. The sounder approach would have been to
exempt all state activities on the grounds that federal micromanagement
under any wage and hour law is vastly more intrusive than any general tax,
no matter what particular activities the federal government regulates. Of
course, that regulation is far more intrusive than any litigation over damages,
no matter what their size. (Size need not matter because fines and damage
awards could be set equally in expectation.) The only dislocation that anyone
could observe from the tax is a possible compensating wage increase. But the
minimum wage and overtime laws can, depending how those numbers are
set, have a massive effect on who is hired, retained, promoted, and fired. It
also skews the operations of any office whether it discharges nontraditional
or traditional functions.
Rehnquist’s conceptual concession in National League made it easy for
Justice Blackmun, who had meekly concurred in National League, to switch
sides in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.76 His view
was that a long line of inconsistent case law decisions demonstrated the
courts’ inability to make the distinction between traditional/nontraditional
activities work. That was surely evident with mass transit, which historically
has been undertaken by both private and government actors.77 But if that
distinction is unworkable, by all means extend the prohibition against federal
regulation to all state functions, which was how matters stood before the 1974
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968).
See id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 845.
Id. at 852.
469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985).
Id. at 535–36.
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extension of the original 1938 version of the FLSA. In paving the way for
this result, Justice Brennan’s National League dissent drew heavily on Chief
Justice Stone’s opinion in California to insist that exercises of plenary federal
power under the Commerce Clause were exempt from the constitutional
limitations applicable to the taxing power.78 Yet Brennan gave no explanation
as to why this distinction matters when, if anything, it cuts in the opposite
direction given that regulation is always more intrusive than taxation.
Brennan was, as Rehnquist insisted, “simply wrong.”79 National League did
not involve safety issues that could cause harm to persons outside the
jurisdiction, as in California. It only involved how the local governments
organized their own business, where the federal interest in overriding state
discretion is at its low ebb, given that state law can supply its own workplace
rules—think workers’ compensation—to these workers as they did before the
1974 amendment.
Once the point is recognized, it is easy to document the gratuitous level of
federal interference that comes to both essential and proprietary functions.
Here are four examples that show how the game plays out, once the federal
government is unleashed.
In Auer v. Robbins, the key question was how to interpret the FLSA
statutory provision that exempts “bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional” employees from overtime pay requirements.80 The obvious
sense of the provision is that senior officials should not have to work on the
clock or otherwise receive overtime protections. The position surely is
consistent with common business practice where these upper-level
employees invariably receive weekly, monthly, or annual salaries that are not
linked to their hourly outputs. In a market situation, no government agency
must decree which workers fall into what category. Each firm can adopt its
own rules for its own purposes, and keep its management options open and
its costs under control. But once the classification is required by statute,
someone must set these rules for firms in the myriad number of cases where
there are layers of managerial hierarchy that do not fit easily into the two-tier
wage/salary dichotomy imposed under the FLSA.
In Auer, the point of application was whether police sergeants and police
lieutenants were entitled to the same overtime protection as ordinary patrol
officers.81 A quick look at their job descriptions makes it clear that police
sergeants prepare daily work assignments for, and supervise the activities of,
78.
79.
80.
81.

Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 865–67, 869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 854 & n.18, 855 & n.19.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 454 (1997).
See id. at 455.
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various patrol officers.82 The police lieutenant supervises sergeants and patrol
officers to act as commanding officers when their superiors are unavailable.83
Neither of these definitions was prepared with an eye to the FLSA, and both
dictate the conclusion that they are exempt salaried workers. In spite of the
easiness of the statutory question, Justice Scalia punted by giving extensive
deference to a federal agency in construing its own regulations—permitting
such blatant abuses.84 Needless to say, since the federal government can call
the tune, Congress could impose these overtime rules on high-level police
officials even if Auer had come out the other way. The manifest dislocations
seem clear.
Nonetheless, the law can take strange turns on the interpretive questions.
Thus, the administrative demand for judicial deference was rejected in
Christensen v. Harris County,85 on the question of whether FLSA overtime
regulations applicable to Harris County allowed the sheriff’s department to
insist that its workers take “comp time”—i.e., time off for prior overtime—

82. See CITY OF CERES, POLICE SERGEANT JOB DESCRIPTION (2017),
http://www.ci.ceres.ca.us/jobdescriptions/PoliceSergeant.pdf (“SUMMARY DESCRIPTION:
Under direction, plans, directs, supervises, assigns, reviews, and participates in the work of law
enforcement staff involved in traffic and field patrol, investigations, crime prevention, community
relations, and related services and activities; serves as watch commander on an assigned shift;
oversees and participates in all work activities; assumes responsibility for assigned special
programs, projects, or department-wide functions or activities; coordinates activities with other
agencies; and performs a variety of administrative and technical tasks relative to assigned area of
responsibility.”).
83. See, e.g., Kristine Tucker, What Does a Lieutenant Do in a Police Department?, HOUS.
CHRON., http://work.chron.com/lieutenant-police-department-26016.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2017) (“Lieutenants are ranking police officials who have leadership responsibilities in police
departments. Their credentials enable them to supervise entire precincts when higher-ranking
officials, such as captains and colonels, are unavailable. Lieutenants have many of the same
responsibilities as lower-ranking police officers, but also plan work schedules, oversee
departmental cases, book and process criminals, assist with detective work, conduct internal
investigations, and help officers with situations that require seniority or expertise in the field.”).
84. Auer, 519 U.S. at 457–58. Justice Scalia’s reasoning was dreadful—analogizing these
officers to assembly line workers subject to pay reductions for “variations in the quality or
quantity of the work performed.” See id. at 455 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1996)). These
pay reductions make sense for line workers paid on a piecework basis, but not for senior officials,
including the captain, who are always subject to general disciplinary rules for dereliction in office,
a set of procedures that is wholly different from quality or quantity rules.
85. 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
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instead of receiving extra cash payments.86 The motivation for this decision
was obviously fiscal in part, but it also played into management work
assignment issues. No one disputed the extensive FLSA involvement in the
area.87 Nonetheless, the sheriffs claimed that the provisions of the FLSA
blocked the County’s proposal, which was backed by a letter drafted in the
Federal Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division that appeared to
give its blessing to the proposed arrangement. Ultimately, the Court held,
correctly, that the FLSA unambiguously “imposes a restriction upon an
employer’s efforts to prohibit the use of compensatory time when employees
request to do so; that provision says nothing about restricting an employer’s
efforts to require employees to use compensatory time.”88 Hence the practice
was legitimate. But to reach that conclusion, the Court had to decide that
Chevron deference did not apply to the informal interpretation of the Wage
and Hour Division. The contrast with Auer shows the plasticity of modern
interpretive rules under administrative law.
Yet it should be understood that both Auer and Christensen are only two
skirmishes in a far larger war, all of which are fought on somewhat different
terrain. First, Congress at any time may amend the FLSA to do what the Wage
and Hour Division thought it had. Nor does the decision put an end to the
extreme deference afforded to federal officials under Auer, given how it is
easy for determined judges to import ambiguity into even the clearest statutes.
Indeed, in many cases, the greatest danger lurks from administrative
decisions that do not involve matters of statutory construction, and hence fall
outside the traditional categories of administrative review. Most notable in
this regard is the final rule that the Wage and Hour Division of the United
States Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued in May 2016 that reduced the
exemption of certain executive, administrative, and professional employees
from the minimum wage and overtime protections under the Fair Labor
86. The FLSA provision in question was Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2(a)(5), 99 Stat. 787, 788
(1994) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (2012)):
(5) An employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of
a State, or an interstate governmental agency—
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided
under paragraph (1), and
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be
permitted by the employee’s employer to use such time within a reasonable
period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not
unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.
87. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 578–80 (discussing the FLSA amendments and its
regulation of overtime compensation for State employees).
88. Id. at 585.
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Standards Act of 1938, by changing the dollar amount that separates salaried
from hourly workers.89 After its own internal review, DOL raised the
threshold from $23,660 to $47,476 per year. This is a big deal. The new
regulation, which was to go into effect December 2016, would have had a
major effect on the behavior of employees in private, nonprofit, and state and
local government, forcing salary adjustments, job reclassification, layoffs,
and budgetary shortfalls, dealing with millions of public employees.90 But the
decision was enjoined in Nevada v. U.S. Department of Labor.91 And so far
the decision has not been appealed by the Trump administration, so that the
matter is dead, at least for the moment. This shows again how the general rule
of deference leads to major flips in administrative approach, which is itself a
major indictment of the entire FLSA enterprise.
As this issue is likely to occur, it is important to see how the application
of the FLSA fits into the general approach taken here. In dealing with legality
of these wage orders, the FLSA could apply a nondiscrimination approach to
state and local governments. After all, the state and local government units
are not singled out, but are only subject to the same regulations as private
employers, who face similar dislocations. But in this case the
nondiscrimination principle offers no safe refuge for the proposed exaction.
The logic behind the nondiscrimination rule is that its effectiveness depends
on its operation as an indirect constraint on government discretion, which it
surely does on tax matters, at least in the common situation where the tax that
one wishes to impose on one’s opponents has to be imposed on one’s own
interest group. That tie-in slows down the enactment of new rules because of
the built-in opposition by a wide range of independent and organized groups.
But in this context, there is no real political blowback against the DOL for
imposing the rules on the states. The only time that there could have been
political retribution was by having the DOL impose that same rule on
Congress and the various branches of the federal government. That tied
arrangement would make the agency think long and hard on how it deals with
others. It is just this principle for example that works so well in the context
of the dormant Commerce Clause, where local governments can only tax
89. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.600–.607 (2017); see also Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions
for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed.
Reg. 32,391, 32,392–94 (May 23, 2016) (executive summary to final rule).
90. See, e.g., Letter from John H. Coatsworth, Provost, Columbia Univ., to Deans, Exec.
Vice President for Arts & Scis., Exec. Vice President for Health & Biomedical Scis., Exec. Vice
President for Research & Dir., Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia Univ. (Aug. 26,
2016), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa/docs/MS_CUMC_ressal16.html (explaining how
FLSA guidelines affect Columbia’s research operations).
91. 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
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foreign, i.e., out of state, commerce if they are prepared to tax their homebased competitors.92
Decidedly, that is not what is going on here. The nondiscrimination is only
between state and local employers and all private employers. There is no
reason why DOL officials should find themselves constrained by this tied
arrangement if they are quite happy to impose the same restrictions on both
groups of outsiders in a single burst of administrative enthusiasm. The acid
test is whether the DOL is willing to force federal agencies to abide by the
same massive shift in dealing with its own employees. The answer is an
emphatic no. The FLSA does cover federal employees, but only under a
different program, run by the U.S. Office of Public Management (“OPM”),
which sets its rules for federal employees independently of the Wage and
Hour Division. To date, OPM has refused to apply the same restrictions on
federal employers, which is strong evidence of their disruptive capacity.
As a matter of first principle, this increase targeted against the states
should fail on the correct view that states and local governments should be in
principle absolutely immune from all wage and hour regulations. It is also the
case that it should be exempt from these regulations under an accurate
application, in this context, of the nondiscrimination principle. And, finally,
the utter lack of any parity principle means that the entire notion of equal and
independent sovereigns has been wholly abandoned by reading the FLSA in
an expansive fashion. At this point, the only framework that lets the DOL
have its way against the states is the Wechsler position that the states have
enough clout in the legislative arena to protect themselves through the
political process.93 That position is analogous to the similar view under the
Takings Clause, advanced most notably by Professor Saul Levmore, that
insists that well-positioned local interests should not receive any
compensation in the case of disproportionate land use regulations, as they are
able to protect themselves in the political process.94 Only the individual or
firm that is “singled out” for special treatment should be entitled to some
constitutional protection.
I think that the Levmore view is misguided in the takings context, and that
the proof of the pudding lies in the eating.95 It is certainly permissible to guess
from the ex ante position that these well-positioned and organized groups
might do well in most political conflicts that threaten their interests. One
92. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
93. See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 546.
94. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344–45
(1991).
95. For a further discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v.
Department of Agriculture, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 734, 746–50 (2017).
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could speculate, for example, that these protected interests could easily rebuff
ninety percent of the political attacks on their position. But so what? There
are still the other ten percent of the cases, and in these, it can often be that
these groups go down to defeat. At this point, in the ex post state of the world,
the strong negative skew observed in the outcome offers powerful evidence
that the process did not work as it should in those cases—assuming, of course,
these groups were right in the particular case. That question, however, can
only be answered by solving the substantive Takings Clause issue that this
hands-off approach seeks to avoid. To answer that question, it becomes
necessary to decide whether the organized group has lost an undeserved
privilege, as in the form of a tax subsidy, or whether it is subject to a
disability, e.g., the loss of air rights in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York,96 to a coalition that is stronger than its own. This appeal to
political process offers no short-cut from the full-scale takings analysis. The
extra deference has the same unacceptable consequences on matters of state
immunity from federal regulation.
Indeed, it would be a mistake to think that the only reason to prevent these
impositions on any targeted group is Wechsler’s political-process view. The
purpose of any systematic inquiry is not to defend this or that group, but to
develop an optimal set of political institutions, which increases the likelihood
of net social gain from each invocation of the Takings Clause, or for that
matter any doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Those objectives cannot
be achieved if any group, whether or not established, is forced to expend
enormous resources to repel confiscatory attacks. The legal system should be
vigilant to make sure that no coalition is put in a position where it is able to
seize the levers of the political process to redistribute wealth and
opportunities in its own direction at the expense of the rest of the population.
The only way that can be done is to look at the situation ex post in discrete
contexts in order to reject outcomes that demonstrate that a massive and
explicit shift on wealth has occurred. No ex ante guesses can substitute for
the ex post inquiry that has the benefit of seeing how the political process has
revealed itself in a particular case.
The simple truth here is that all these predictions of interest group
outcomes are highly contingent, in that small changes in initial conditions
could lead to radically different outcomes. The active players may well be
multiple coalitions with complex alliances, so that it is hard to know in
advance which groups will line up with each other. Even the strongest groups
have divided interests or complex motives which makes it hard for them to
operate as a unified body on a wide range of issues. In some settings, small
96.
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but cohesive interest groups can dominate a larger but more indifferent group
in order to obtain needed building permits. But in other cases, indignant
voters can impose onerous zoning ordinances on those same developers. So
rather than predict in the ex ante state of the world, the law should develop a
set of rules that seeks to stop the rent seeking by including in the safeguards
a look at the distributional consequences in the ex post state of the world,
where the needed information is now available.
In the context of the FLSA, the interest-group politics are intense. It is also
clear that when the Obama administration was in power, labor unions wielded
a disproportionate influence over the operation of all government agencies.
State and local governments and their allies came out second best, by issuing
rules that, if they had been allowed to stand, would have done much to cripple
the effectiveness of state and local governments. This administrative
adventurism paves the way for increased federal control in a wide number of
areas. The basic principle of necessary implication cries out against
Wechsler’s view that political safeguards do the job when all too often they
don’t. The right approach is to overturn Garcia by expanding National
League to all activities of state and local governments. It is the only way to
restore the initial constitutional balance that has been thrown off kilter by the
ill-advised innovations of the Supreme Court in its post-New Deal
jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have sought to trace the evolution of the doctrines of
intergovernmental immunity. Some such doctrine is necessarily required to
make sense of a Constitution that does not devote a single word to any of the
three manifestations of the problem: tort, taxation, and regulation. It is
therefore necessary to track down the appropriate principles by a process of
necessary implication from the structure of the text, which in turn requires an
appreciation of the underlying assumptions of constitutional design. Finding
that correct balance necessarily requires a return to matters of first principle
about the nature of our constitutional government. On this issue, the
fundamental transformation in American life has been the judicial
transformation of what was in its origins a classical liberal constitution to a
modern progressive one. The former system—with notable exceptions for
slavery, for example—sought to implement a system of limited government
with strong contractual and property rights. This was no mystery because in
one sense the intellectual context for the drafting of the Federal Constitution
was similar to those principles used in establishing the state constitutions of
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the prior decade.97 The modern system tends to radically expand the scope of
both federal and state power where they do not conflict, and to champion
federal power where they do conflict. The result has been a constitution with
extensive federal powers and weak protection of property and contract rights.
That transformation is also evident in the treatment of intergovernmental
immunity. The earlier system stressed the coequal sovereign status of state
and federal government, and thus accepted a principle of parity, such that the
regulation, taxation, or liability of the states by the federal government was
judged by the same principles as the regulation, taxation, or liability of the
federal government by the states. In some cases, chiefly in the domain of
regulation, the principle of parity points to a rule in which each level of
government is wholly immune from control by the other. In the realm of
taxation, the general rule of absolute immunity applies to the
instrumentalities of both state and federal government, but a
nondiscrimination rule applies to the revenue of state and federal employees.
No tort action for damages of any sort was applied for the ordinary operations
of government.
This system proved stable for a long period of time, but with the ascent of
federal power under the Commerce Clause during the New Deal, the balance
was shifted, and shifted in an unwise fashion. Now the Supremacy Clause is
said to fuel federal dominance of states on both matters of regulation and
taxation, which leads to federal activities that are highly intrusive on the way
in which states can conduct their own government affairs. The unfortunate
efforts of the Obama-era Department of Labor to extend the reach of the
FLSA over state agencies shows the limitless nature of the power, subject
only to political restraints that often prove highly ineffective. The correct
response is a return to the earlier constitutional principles, which worked well
when in place. A constitution is intended to be an enduring document based
on first principles of government. The older rules on intergovernmental
immunity were honest efforts to reach the proper legal equilibrium. The
recent rejection of these rules represents a major decline in the wisdom and
effectiveness of modern American constitutionalism under its flawed
progressive model.
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